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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: The Nature of a CIA Master Plan for Production

REFERENCES: My memoranda for record:

- (a) Departmental Participation in the Preparation of CIA Reports and Estimates, 7 October 1949
- (b) The Importance of a CIA Master Plan for Production, 14 October 1949
- (c) The Requirements of a CIA Master Plan for Production, 24 October 1949

1. The purpose of this paper is to supplement Reference (c) by discussing in somewhat more detail what a CIA master plan for production should or might be like. It is recognized at the outset, however, that any speculation in this vein by a staff officer is highly subject to error, and that only the producing components of CIA have the experience requisite to a full development of the concept of a master plan. This discussion is presented simply to clarify the concept of the writer of this series of memoranda. For these reasons, no concrete conclusions are reached.

2. The foremost characteristic of a CIA master plan should be its elasticity, particularly in the early stages of its application. As experience built up over a period of time, more and more detail could be programmed, and the characteristic of elasticity would decrease in importance relative to the amount of detail covered, but elasticity should remain the foremost characteristic. It must be remembered, nevertheless, that "elasticity" does not imply a sacrifice of form; the plan must not be just yieldingly amorphous.

3. To put the concept of flexibility in another way, a CIA master plan for production should be so conceived and so composed that it would constitute a skeletal framework which would endure as long as the basic global situation. Upon this framework would be hung the developing substance of programs derived from the plan, but responsive to the play of international forces.

4. The central basis for the plan should be the result of both analysis and synthesis of the fragmentary guidance furnished by the various agencies which are consumers of CIA produced intelligence, the

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component fragments being logically arranged and rationalized and made into one whole by interpolation, all in the light of CIA's own estimate of the global situation. The phrase "fragmentary guidance" is used because experience indicates that the fragmentary is all that can be expected along these lines; actually guidance may never be received except in the form of requests over a period of time, on the basis of which future requests can be predicted. The agencies from which CIA should seek guidance are principally the NSC, the NSRB, and the Departments of State and Defense. The subject of guidance will be discussed further in a subsequent paper.

5. Such a basic concept, conditioned by our state of knowledge of the various parts of the world, should lead naturally to the presentation of a broad plan for CIA comprehensive production. As a preface to this plan, there should be stated in broad terms the production mission of CIA, which must be composed so as to cover what practice has shown is required to be produced in order to fulfill CIA's responsibility under the National Security Act of 1947 for the production of "national" or "strategic" intelligence. The plan should outline the fields in which CIA is required to produce national intelligence, should establish area priorities, and should explain the scope of reports and estimates of this nature and the point of view (national security versus departmental responsibility) from which they are approached. The plan should also outline the way in which CIA would utilize primary reports and estimates (CIA and departmental) as the raw material for comprehensive production.

6. The next phase of the master plan would turn to the IAC agencies for support of the CIA plan for comprehensive production. From an analysis of the substantive competence of the several IAC agencies would stem plans for primary production for each, limited strictly to what is desired by CIA in the way of support. Each agency plan should be prefaced by an appropriate statement, again in broad terms, of extra-departmental responsibilities to CIA for primary production. Each plan should cover general subject and area priorities, as well as the scope of reports and estimates to be programmed and the point of view from which it is desired they be approached.

7. Having exhausted the potentialities of the departments for primary production, the master plan would proceed to fill the gaps at this level with a plan for CIA primary production. Thus the sum of all contemplated primary production would equal the total support required by the plan for CIA comprehensive production. Any primary production by CIA in fields of common concern would be planned in the same spirit as the effort to fill gaps, since agreements that CIA should undertake such production would create arbitrary gaps in departmental production which CIA would simultaneously proceed to fill.

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8. After presenting plans for CIA comprehensive production and departmental and CIA primary production, the master plan would undertake a certain amount of actual programming of both CIA and departmental production. The extent of programming to be undertaken would vary in two respects. First, it would vary in respect to elapsed time after the date of inception of the plan, in that as experience grew through application of the plan, more and more programming could be provided. Second, the extent of programming would vary in respect to two categories into which production, both primary and comprehensive, could be divided from the standpoint of CIA ability to foresee requirements. These two categories are: (1) those reports and estimates, the requirements for which can be foreseen well in advance, and (2) those reports and estimates, the requirements for which are relatively difficult to foresee. Each of these categories is discussed separately below.

9. As for the first category, the subject matter and coverage would in general be comparatively fundamental in nature, in fact this category would include the basic intelligence production of the MIS Program, plus other less static production, including both reports and estimates. Although not true of all items, much such intelligence takes considerable time to produce as well as being of long term application. ONE 17-49, "The Strategic Importance of the Far East," is an example of CIA comprehensive production which would fall under this category.

10. Under the first category there is a major subdivision which might be referred to as "periodic reports and estimates." Such production would comprise that required to keep current our national estimate of those aspects of the international situation which, although fundamental, are fluid. The CIA share in this sub-category would include such periodic summaries or reviews or estimates of the current situation in various areas as it became desirable to publish. CIA should also prepare periodic estimates of the future national capabilities of our most likely enemies and our major allies. Very important under this sub-category would be the primary production required by CIA to keep abreast of those fluid aspects of the international situation within the sphere of the IAC agencies. The best examples in this sub-category are in the military field. For instance, periodic reports would be required from the Department of the Army on the order of battle of the ground forces of selected nations. Thus CIA would be kept informed of all important changes in the disposition of major units, the composition of major commands, the composition of the higher command and staff hierarchy, etc. Reports of this nature might be required as often as monthly for some nations. Periodic estimates would be required from the Department of the Army of the fighting quality and capabilities of the ground forces of selected nations for the same reasons, although perhaps not so often.

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11. Reports and estimates in the first category could be rather extensively programmed, since the requirements could be foreseen. Requirements for the second category, however, would be somewhat more difficult to foresee. Programming would therefore be more limited in point of projection into the future, yet because most such production would be required for prompt use, requirements would be relatively more specific and detailed than those pertaining to the other category. The program would be subject to frequent or periodic revisions and additions, which should, however, be systematic.

12. Of course, there will always be that production not included in the categories described above, the requirements for which cannot be foreseen at all. The master plan should provide a means by which CIA could obtain departmental support in response to unforeseen requirements placed upon CIA by proper authority (see paragraph 12 g, Reference (c)). In this respect, the clarification afforded by the plan of the general requirements of CIA for departmental support should facilitate meeting contingencies.

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